

National Research University
Higher School of Economic

As a manuscript

Nikita Zubarev

Affective Sources of Trust in the President of Russia

SUMMARY OF THE DISSERTATION

for the purpose of obtaining academic degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

Academic Supervisor:
PhD
Eduard Ponarin

Moscow, 2024

Statement of research problem and literature review

Citizens of the country differ from each other by the degree of trust in the institutions of power. The concept of political trust has no consensus definition among social scientists. Some understand it as a resource that political actors spend to achieve the desired result. For others, trust is the willingness to follow political leaders in the decisions they make. Trust is also interpreted as a sense of community with a shared understanding of values to be held. Finally, Hetherington defines political trust as “the extent to which people perceive that government produces outcomes consistent with their expectations.”¹ A key part of this definition is the use of the verb “perceive”, since people's opinions about the functioning of political institutions are often at odds with how these institutions actually function.² The main objective of this dissertation research is to clarify several theoretically expected mechanisms that help citizens build political trust.

Differences in levels of political trust at the individual level are often attributed to citizens' reactions to political events. The large distance between the policy course that the government implements and the policy course that the country's residents want to see is the reason for low institutional trust. The economic results of government institutions also affect the level of trust.³ The very process of work of government institutions is important for citizens: if institutions function according to the generally accepted rules of the game, trust in them will not decrease. Finally, the way the media cover political events can also affect the level of trust.⁴

There is no research consensus on which determinants of political trust are the most important. The factors listed above can be attributed to the cognitive model of political trust, as they imply the need to deliberately think about incoming information. An alternative to the “cognitive” origin of institutional trust is the “affective” determinants

¹ Hetherington M. J. *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. P. 9.

² Ibid.

³ Mishler W., Rose R. What Are the Political Consequences of Trust?: A Test of Cultural and Institutional Theories in Russia // *Comparative Political Studies*. 2005. Vol. 38. № 9. P. 1050–1078.

⁴ Citrin J., Stoker L. Political Trust in a Cynical Age // *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2018. T. 21. № 1. P. 49–70.

of trust.⁵ I call this model “alternative” because it explains institutional trust based on individuals' affective reactions. One interpretation of emotional (affective) evaluations of political information suggests that they can be defined as a “composite repository”⁶ of past information processing results. Political psychology interprets people's behavior based on what social groups they belong to, what personality traits and values they have, and what emotions they experience. Affective factors can be defined as “the personal feelings, attitudes, or values of the author or speaker inferred from their words and/or nonverbal behavior”.⁷ Thus, this paper contributes to the research on the sensual side of political trust, which can be explained through citizens' willingness to express views, values, feelings and emotions.

To begin, I will outline what kind of topics are relevant to research on the affective factors of political support. First, there is the theory of social identity theory, which can be defined as “social psychological analysis of the role of self-conception in group membership, group processes, and intergroup relations”.⁸ In part, the influence of identity on behavior and attitudes can be explained through social norms. People get satisfaction when they behave in accordance with the norms established in the group and feel discomfort when they “go against the current”.⁹ National identity is a form of social identity that, according to liberal nationalism, plays a role in modern society as a “glue” that unites culturally diverse people and encourages trust and solidarity.¹⁰ Tang Wenfang showed that strong attachment to the country among Chinese residents is associated with opposition to democratic reforms, several forms of civil disobedience, and capitalist

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Marcus G. E. Emotions in Politics // Annual Review of Political Science. 2000. Vol. 3. № 1. P. 228.

⁷ affective meaning. URL: <https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095354410> (accessed: 10.05.2024).

⁸ Hogg M. A. Social Identity Theory // Contemporary Social Psychological Theories / ed. P. J. Burke. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006. P. 111.

⁹ Axelrod R. An Evolutionary Approach to Norms // The American Political Science Review. 1986. Vol. 80. № 4. P. 1095–1111.

¹⁰ Gustavsson G., Miller D. Why Liberal Nationalism Today? // Liberal Nationalism and Its Critics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019. P. 1–20.

economy.¹¹ Additionally, it has a strong positive effect on trust in the central government. The influence of social identity has also been shown using African data, where voters in elections voted for members of their own ethnic and/or linguistic group.¹² The special power of social (national) identity resides in its ability to reward political leaders for achievements in foreign policy without playing a special role in citizens' assessment of the socio-economic situation in the country.¹³

National pride is an individual's positive affect towards the country that they identify with, as well as its achievements and symbols.¹⁴ This concept is one of the ways to conceptualize forms of citizens' attachment to their country. In publications of Russian researchers, it is possible to distinguish such alternative categories of these forms as “state-citizen” and “national-citizen” identities. Alternatively, if we speak about country level the idea of “nation of nations” has also been put forward.¹⁵ Among the factors that determine the strength of national pride, researchers consider the economic development of the state,¹⁶ economic inequality,¹⁷ nature of the media that people consume,¹⁸ exogenous shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic,¹⁹ generational change,²⁰ and socio-demographic characteristics such as age, educational level and income.²¹ Political

¹¹ Tang W. *Populist Authoritarianism: Chinese Political Culture and Regime Sustainability*. Oxford University Press, 2016.

¹² Posner D. N. *Institutions and Ethnic Politics in Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2005.

¹³ Sharafutdinova G. Public Opinion Formation and Group Identity: The Politics of National Identity Salience in Post-Crimea Russia // *Problems of Post-Communism*. 2020. Vol. 69. № 3. P. 1–13.

¹⁴ Müller-Peters A. The significance of national pride and national identity to the attitude toward the single European currency: A Europe-wide comparison // *Journal of Economic Psychology*. 1998. T. 19. № 6. C. 701–719.

¹⁵ Semenenko I.S. Nation, nationalism, national identity: new angles of scientific discourse // *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*. 2015. Vol. 59. № 11. P. 91-102. (In Russ).

¹⁶ Evans M. D. R., Kelley J. National Pride in the Developed World: Survey Data from 24 Nations // *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 2002. Vol. 14. № 3. P. 303–338.

¹⁷ Solt F. Diversionary Nationalism: Economic Inequality and the Formation of National Pride // *The Journal of Politics*. 2011. Vol. 73. № 3. P. 821–830.

¹⁸ Cohen J. What I Watch and Who I Am: National Pride and the Viewing of Local and Foreign Television in Israel // *Journal of Communication*. 2008. Vol. 58. № 1. P. 149–167.

¹⁹ Lim S., Prakash A. Pandemics and citizen perceptions about their country: Did COVID-19 increase national pride in South Korea? // *Nations and Nationalism*. 2021. Vol. 27. № 3. P. 623–637.

²⁰ Tilley J., Heath A. The decline of British national pride // *The British Journal of Sociology*. 2007. Vol. 58. № 4. P. 661–678.

²¹ Chung K., Choe H. South Korean National Pride: Determinants, Changes, and Suggestions // *Asian Perspective*. 2008. Vol. 32. № 1. P. 99–127.; Smith T. W., Kim S. National Pride in Comparative

inequality between ethnic groups could negatively affect the level of national pride of a vulnerable group.²² Pride in country varies along such dimensions as pride in economy, science, sports, art, and literature.²³ The importance of a particular dimension may differ from country to country depending on which aspect of pride is more important for the population.²⁴

Russians with high levels of national pride are now more likely to believe in their country's superiority over other states.²⁵ A good example of this phenomenon is the “post-Crimea consensus” expressed in the high level of support for the country's president and other state institutions. The number of people who consider themselves patriots and are proud of Russia's state symbols has grown.²⁶ As Leontiy Byzov writes: “the archetypal values of strengthening the power, anti-Westernism, and the Russian world have been reanimated in the mass consciousness. The mood of society as a whole has become more radical than the official policy of the authorities.”²⁷

“Rally around the flag effect” can be defined as a sharp increase in support for a political regime, which may be caused by patriotic consolidation of the population or the absence of critical viewpoints in the media. Research on this issue suggests that “rally events” that have domestic or international significance increase the importance of national identity and change behavior of media and opinion leaders.²⁸ Henry Hale showed

Perspective: 1995/96 and 2003/04 // *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 2006. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 127–136.

²² Ray S. *Ethnic Inequality and National Pride* // *Political Psychology*. 2018. Vol. 39. № 2. P. 263–280.

²³ Evans M. D. R., Kelley J. *National Pride in the Developed World: Survey Data from 24 Nations* // *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 2002. Vol. 14. № 3. P. 303–338.

²⁴ Smith T. W., Jarkko L. *National Pride: A Cross-national Analysis*. Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, 1998.

²⁵ Fabrykant M., Magun V. *Dynamics of National Pride Attitudes in Post-Soviet Russia, 1996–2015* // *Nationalities Papers*. 2019. Vol. 47. № 1. P. 20–37.

²⁶ Patriotism: monitoring. URL: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/patriotizm-monitoring> (access date: 10.05.2024). (In Russ); Symbol of Russia. URL: <https://wciom.ru/analytical-reviews/analiticheskii-obzor/simvol-rossii> (access date: 10.05.2024) (In Russ).

²⁷ Byzov L. *Ideological boundaries of the "post-Crimea consensus"* // *Elections against the backdrop of Crimea: the 2016-2018 electoral cycle and prospects for political transit* / ed. V. Fedorov. Moscow: All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), 2018. P. 104. (In Russ).

²⁸ Mueller J. E. *Presidential Popularity from Truman to Johnson* // *The American Political Science Review*. 1970. Vol. 64. № 1. P. 18–34.; Baker W. D., Oneal J. R. *Patriotism or Opinion Leadership?: The Nature and Origins of the “Rally ’Round the Flag” Effect* // *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 2001. Vol. 45. № 5. P. 661–687.

that the positive effect of Crimea joining Russia and the subsequent increase in support for Vladimir Putin was stronger for those who watched less state television.²⁹ However, there is also evidence showing that the events of 2014 may have interacted with already existing strong nationalist attitudes. Approval of Putin and perceptions of his competence rose much more than national pride.³⁰ At the same time, not all institutions may benefit from the rally effect. For some of them, “rally events” could have a negative effect.³¹

Despite new publications demonstrating that a significant proportion of people exposed to the rally around the flag may have been influenced by the social desirability bias,³² the need to explain genuine support among the population remains. Previous work has not considered a potential mediating effect of national identity.

Subjective well-being can be defined as “people's emotional reactions, satisfaction with certain areas of life and general judgments of life satisfaction”.³³ Citizens tend to rely on “intuitive shortcuts” (cognitive shortcuts) in forming their attitudes towards politicians and institutions.³⁴ It can be suggested that citizens, whose level of subjective well-being (happiness) has increased, will attribute such a change to the work of their country's leadership, which will give citizens a reason to be proud of this country and, consequently, to trust state institutions more. This direction of causality suggests that the mediator of the relationship between subjective well-being and trust in the president is national pride.

²⁹ Hale H. E. How Crimea Pays: Media, Rallying 'Round the Flag, and Authoritarian Support // *Comparative Politics*. 2018. Vol. 50. № 3. P. 369–391.

³⁰ Alexseev M. A., Hale H. E. Rallying 'round the leader more than the flag: Changes in Russian nationalist public opinion 2013–14 // *The New Russian Nationalism: Imperialism, Ethnicity and Authoritarianism 2000-2015* / eds. P. Kolstø, H. Blakkisrud. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. P. 192–220.

³¹ Frye T. Economic Sanctions and Public Opinion: Survey Experiments From Russia // *Comparative Political Studies*. 2019. Vol. 52. № 7. P. 967–994.

³² Hale H. E. Authoritarian rallying as reputational cascade? Evidence from Putin's popularity surge after Crimea // *American Political Science Review*. 2022. Vol. 116. № 2. P. 580–594.

³³ Diener E. et al. Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress // *Psychological Bulletin*. 1999. Vol. 125. № 2. P. 276–302.

³⁴ Achen C. H., Bartels L. M. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press, 2016.

In addition, previous research has demonstrated that (1) there is a strong positive correlation between subjective well-being and national pride³⁵ and that (2) happy and more satisfied citizens are more likely to trust the current government.³⁶ These theses suggest that first of all the level of national pride of citizens changes, which then affects the indicators of subjective well-being, which subsequently decreases or increases trust in the president. It follows that from the point of view of the theory, both national pride and subjective well-being can play the role of a mediator regulating trust in the president. My work aims to test the system of relationships between national pride, subjective well-being, and trust in the president.

It is important to note that the data used in previous studies do not allow us to determine the direction of causality between subjective well-being and national pride. Does the level of happiness affect the pride in one's country or, on the contrary, does national pride affect subjective well-being? This question requires clarification. Both directions of causality are possible.

Research question: What is the role of subjective well-being and national pride in determining trust in the president of Russia?

The answer to the research question will allow us to understand whether changes in well-being lead to changes in pride or, conversely, whether an increase or decrease in well-being leads to changes in pride. I will also clarify if pride or subjective well-being can play a mediating role in determining trust in the president. The focus on the figure of the president was chosen because Vladimir Putin has been in the top leadership position in Russia for more than 20 years and plays a special role in the symbolic policy of the state.³⁷

³⁵ Morrison M., Tay L., Diener E. Subjective Well-Being and National Satisfaction: Findings From a Worldwide Survey // *Psychological Science*. 2011. Vol. 22. № 2. P. 166–171.

³⁶ Liberini F., Redoano M., Proto E. Happy voters // *Journal of Public Economics*. 2017. Vol. 146. P. 41–57.; Ward G. Happiness and Voting: Evidence from Four Decades of Elections in Europe // *American Journal of Political Science*. 2020. Vol. 64. № 3. P. 504–518.

³⁷ Foxall A. Photographing Vladimir Putin: Masculinity, nationalism and visuality in Russian political culture // *Geopolitics*. 2013. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 132-156.

An additional **research question** was formulated to form a full understanding of groups of the population that trust the president. What socio-demographic characteristics and value orientations best describe Russians who trust the president? The answer to this research question will make it possible to clarify another affective aspect of political support, namely the role of values.

Purpose and objectives of the study

The purpose of the study is to determine cause and effect in the system of relations between subjective well-being, national pride and trust in the president of Russia.

Objectives of the study:

1. Determine the theoretical basis for the relationship between national pride, subjective well-being and trust in the president.
2. Determine the significance of subjective well-being and national pride as potential mediators of trust in the president.
3. Describe the main value orientations and socio-demographic characteristics of population groups with different levels of trust in the president.
4. Clarify the direction of the causal relationship between subjective well-being and national pride.

Theoretical and methodological foundations of the study and hypotheses

To begin with, I will define three key concepts, that will be examined in this dissertation. Trust in the president is part of a broader concept of political support that describes citizens' attitudes toward different elements of the political system. Trust in the president measures the degree of citizens' confidence in the national leader or, in other words, the degree of belief that the president will act in good faith and that they possess a level of competence that meets the needs and wants of those who trust.³⁸ Next, national

³⁸ Citrin J., Stoker L. Political Trust in a Cynical Age // Annual Review of Political Science. 2018. T. 21. № 1. P. 49–70.

pride refers to a favorable attitude to one's own nation, a sense of respect for it.³⁹ This attitude can be described as joy for the success of the country with which one identifies. Those who are proud to belong to a nation may believe that their community is superior to other national communities. People with high national pride draw attention to the object of their pride in order to make sure that members of outside groups have a positive view of the cultural products produced by their community.⁴⁰ On the one hand pride can be a feeling rooted in social norms and on the other hand a product of rational judgments about a country's achievements.⁴¹ Data limitations prevent me from accounting for the distinction between the two aspects of pride. However, this does not preclude me from interpreting the results of the empirical part of the study from the perspective of social identity theory. I consider the use of national pride as the only indicator of attachment to the country sufficient, as the focus of my analysis is aimed at explaining the differences in people's attitudes depending on their **willingness** to declare a favorable attitude towards the nation or a special sense of attachment to it. Finally, I use a well-established definition of subjective well-being. Researchers define the latter as individual assessments of quality of life. These can be both emotional reactions to events that happen to people and conscious assessments of satisfaction with such spheres of life as marriage and career.⁴²

The following set of hypotheses was tested in this paper. Some hypotheses were proposed in the form of alternative statements, where the logic of the considered relationships may contradict each other. This approach to formulating hypotheses was chosen because publications on the subject of the thesis research offer different theoretical

³⁹ Smith T. W., Kim S. National Pride in Comparative Perspective: 1995/96 and 2003/04 // *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 2006. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 127–136.

⁴⁰ Magun V.S. Magun A.V. Feelings of connection with the country and pride in its achievements. (Russian data in the context of international comparisons) // *Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'*. 2009. № 3. P. 32-44. (In Russ).

⁴¹ Fabrykant M., Magun V. Grounded and normative dimensions of national pride in comparative perspective // *Dynamics of National Identity. Media and Societal Factors of What We Are* / eds. J. Grimm et al. Routledge, 2016. P. 83–112.

⁴² Diener E., Oishi S., Lucas R. E. Personality, Culture, and Subjective Well-Being: Emotional and Cognitive Evaluations of Life // *Annual Review of Psychology*. 2003. Vol. 54. № Volume 54, 2003. P. 403–425.

approaches. We do not know which direction of causal relationships between variables is correct. Therefore, my work aims at empirical comparison of competing approaches.

First, we tested the classic claim of liberal nationalism that national identity can be a source of trust in the institutions of the state. This assumption is based on the expectation that members of the same national community will treat each other fairly, simply given the fact of membership in the same group.⁴³ This idea coincides with the thesis of social identity theory that members of one social group, when making decisions, will make choices that lead to a better outcome for the members of their group than for those who are not members of the group.⁴⁴ I expect that Russians with high levels of national pride will be more likely to trust the president because his figure plays a special role in Russia's symbolic politics. He acts as the ultimate patriot who can fulfill all the needs of ordinary citizens.⁴⁵ I hypothesize that Russians with high national pride trust the president because they expect his policies to be fair to them, given that he is the central representative of the community they are proud to belong to. Hypothesis 1.1 follows from these theoretical expectations:

Hypothesis 1.1: *There is a positive correlation between trust in the president and national pride among Russians.*

The logic of “blind retrospection” suggests that respondents may attribute their own level of happiness to the performance of incumbents. One consequence of this may be a decrease or increase in trust in the president, as citizens will have a reason to thank or “punish” the incumbent who provides a certain level of well-being for them.⁴⁶ This could result in a decrease or increase in national pride. “Blind retrospection” refers to a pattern

⁴³ Lenard P. T., Miller D. Trust and National Identity // The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust / ed. E. M. Uslaner. Oxford University Press, 2018. P. 57-74.

⁴⁴ Huddy L. From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory // Political Psychology. 2001. T. 22. № 1. P. 127–156.

⁴⁵ Gill G. J. Symbolism and Regime Change in Russia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013.; Wengle S., Evans C. Symbolic state-building in contemporary Russia // Post-Soviet Affairs. 2018. Vol. 34. № 6. P. 384–411.

⁴⁶ Healy A., Malhotra N. Retrospective Voting Reconsidered // Annual Review of Political Science. 2013. Vol. 16., 2013. P. 285–306.

of retrospective political support when voters rely on simple, intuitive, and often emotionally loaded judgments to form attitudes toward politicians and institutions.⁴⁷ Hypothesis 1.2 follows from this.

Hypothesis 1.2: *There is a positive correlation between subjective well-being and trust in the president among Russians.*

Social identity theory points to the connection between group identity and the attitudes and behavior of individuals. The subjective well-being of individuals, who strongly identify with national community, may change depending on whether the community is currently succeeding or failing.⁴⁸ This occurs because the self-esteem of citizens with high national pride falls into a relationship with how these citizens perceive the subjective status of their country.⁴⁹ In this regard, hypothesis 1.3 is put forward:

Hypothesis 1.3: *There is a positive correlation between national pride and subjective well-being of Russians.*

Given the relationship between the three variables (national pride, happiness and institutional trust), the mechanism of formation of trust in the president may be even more complex. On the one hand, national pride can increase happiness, a change in the level of which will be followed by changes in trust in the president. On the other hand, there is a possible logic in which first happiness will decrease or increase, which will become a reason to be less or more proud of one's national identity, and this will be followed by a change in trust. Since the theory used to form hypotheses 1.1 - 1.3 provides evidence for both mechanisms, hypothesis 2 was divided into two parts:

⁴⁷ Achen C. H., Bartels L. M. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press, 2016.

⁴⁸ Tajfel H., Turner J. C. *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior* // Key readings in social psychology. *Political psychology: Key readings* / eds. J. T. Jost, J. Sidanius. New York, NY:: Psychology Press, 2004. P. 276–293.

⁴⁹ De Vries R. E. Self, in-group, and out-group evaluation: bond or breach? // *European Journal of Social Psychology*. 2003. Vol. 33. № 5. P. 609–621.

Hypothesis 2.1: *National pride plays a mediating role between subjective well-being and trust in the president of Russia. The growth of subjective well-being is positively related to national pride, with stronger levels of the latter leading to an increase in trust in the president.*

Hypothesis 2.2: *Subjective well-being plays the role of a mediator between national pride and trust in the president of Russia. The growth of national pride is positively related to subjective well-being, with stronger levels of the latter leading to increased trust in the president.*

Christin Welzel's theory of emancipative democratization was used to put forward a hypothesis regarding a negative relationship between emancipative values, on the one hand, and trust in the president and national pride, on the other. This expectation is based on the fact that population groups with such value orientations tend to be more demanding of the acting government. Citizens with high emancipative values may perceive the current political course as not representing their interests. Moreover, such values are usually associated with the desire to make decisions at the individual rather than collective level. This leads to lower levels of national pride as a dimension of national identity that is highly dependent on group norms.⁵⁰

Hypothesis 3: *Russians with higher levels of the emancipative values index have lower levels of national pride and trust in the president.*

A secondary task is to test the hypothesis of a causal relationship between national pride and subjective well-being. As with hypothesis 2, the theory suggests the possibility of two directions of causality. On the one hand, changes in national pride may affect subjective well-being because the subjective status of the national community has

⁵⁰ Welzel C. *Freedom Rising: Human empowerment and the contemporary quest for emancipation.* Cambridge University Press, 2013.

changed in some way in the eyes of an individual whose identity is particularly important for belonging to a national community.⁵¹ The logic of "blind retrospection"⁵² is also possible: citizens attribute a change in the level of subjective well-being to the results of the work of incumbents, which gives them a reason to change the level of pride in the country that these incumbents represent. Accordingly, hypothesis 4 was divided into two parts as follows:

Hypothesis 4.1: *National pride has a positive causal effect on subjective well-being among Russians.*

Hypothesis 4.2: *Subjective well-being has a positive causal effect on the national pride of Russians.*

Data and methods

Empirical foundation of the dissertation consists of survey data collected by the Institute for Comparative Social Studies (CESSI) through the CATI⁵³ method. The data was collected for a research project organized by Ronald F. Inglehart Laboratory for Comparative Social Research.⁵⁴ Respondents were initially selected in 60 regions of Russia to form a representative sample consisting of 18,768 people (data collection in 2019-2020). The sample is representative in terms of sex and age composition and the share of rural population in each of the 60 regions. The sample calculation was based on the data of Rosstat as of January 1, 2018 and the All-Russian Population Census (2010). Then, in 2021, it was decided to select 2,254 people from the first wave to conduct a panel study. Taking into account the issue of attrition, the sample size for the data collected in 2021 (second wave of the survey) was 1,517 people. When the survey continued in the

⁵¹ Tajfel H., Turner J. C. *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior // Key readings in social psychology. Political psychology: Key readings / eds. J. T. Jost, J. Sidanius. New York, NY:: Psychology Press, 2004. P. 276–293.*

⁵² Achen C. H., Bartels L. M. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government. Princeton University Press, 2016.*

⁵³ Computer Assisted Telephone Interview.

⁵⁴ Almakaeva A., Andreenkova A., Klimova A., Soboleva N., Ponarin E. *LCSR Regional Survey 2019-2020.*

fall of 2022 (third wave of the survey) 1,312 more people were recruited (565 who participated in all three waves of the survey, and an additional recruitment of 747 respondents from the first wave).

Chapter 2 evaluates a longitudinal mediation model using a structural equation modeling approach that, among other things, allows simultaneous estimation of effects for multiple dependent variables. The set of parameters (relationships) whose testing is implemented in Chapter 2 was theoretically justified because theory is of particular importance when evaluating models within structural equation modeling. The direction of causal relationships refers to assumptions rather than parameters whose test can be unambiguously interpreted. Model evaluation results cannot confirm or refute theoretically expected causal relationships. Rex Klein concludes that “the only thing that supports directionality specifications is argument, that is, the quality of the ideas behind the hypothesis that X causes Y instead of the reverse, or that the two variables mutually affect each other. Nothing from analysis matters in this regard.”⁵⁵ The possible existence of an external (exogenous), not included in the analysis, variable that affects both X and Y introduces an additional constraint on the interpretation of the modeling results. This implies that I assume not only that the direction of causality is correct, but also that the variables included in the analysis lack any unmeasured common cause.⁵⁶

The use of panel data in the dissertation study provides additional grounds for interpreting the findings in terms of causal inference. Panel data allows for one of the assumptions that must be met to determine cause and effect: the cause must occur before the effect.⁵⁷ Granger formalized this rule by proposing that “x is a cause of y, if at time t the variable x_t helps predict the variable y_{t+1} ”.⁵⁸ Determining the temporal ordering of the variables allows me to interpret observed patterns in terms of causality with greater

⁵⁵ Kline R. B. Assumptions in Structural Equation Modeling // Handbook of Structural Equation Modeling / eds. R. H. Hoyle. New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2023. P. 133.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Hume D. A Treatise of Human Nature / eds. D. F. Norton, M. J. Norton. Oxford University Press, 2000.

⁵⁸ Kuersteiner G. M. Granger-Sims causality // Macroeconometrics and Time Series Analysis / eds. S. N. Durlauf, L. E. Blume. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2010. P. 119–134.

confidence. The final model was fitted by comparing models with different combinations of parameters using the test for equality of model fit to the data.

Chapter 3 uses multinomial logistic regression models to describe the socio-demographic characteristics and value orientations of Russians with different levels of trust in the president and different strength of national pride. Tests on compliance with assumptions and goodness-of-fit tests (Hosmer-Lemeshow, Brant, and Hausman-McFadden tests) were performed to select a specific type of logistic regression.

Scope and Limitations

Results of this study may have been influenced by the timing of data collection. Evidently, they were collected at a time when Russians were affected by two major shocks: the COVID-19 pandemic and the start of the Special Military Operation. Like any other crises, these events may have created uncertainty about the future and formed incentives to change attitudes. In Russia, support for values of equality changed depending on personal experience of the pandemic⁵⁹, and changes in labor status (loss of job or business) may have negatively affected subjective well-being.⁶⁰ At the same time, the effects of the pandemic on political attitudes are not entirely clear. As Sokolov and Zavadskaya showed, during the first wave of the pandemic, the economic consequences of the crisis were virtually unrelated to changes in political support, while fears of getting infected and fears for loved ones getting infected, on the contrary, were associated with higher levels of trust in state institutions.⁶¹ Accordingly, the crisis context when the data were collected may have affected the nature of the findings. Caution should be exercised in applying the causal logic described here to contexts where the socio-economic structure of society is not affected by crises.

⁵⁹ Korsunova V.I., Sokolov B.O. Dynamics of support for emancipative values in Russia during the COVID-19 pandemic // *Sotsiologicheskiy Zhurnal*. 2023. Vol. 29. № 2. P. 8–24. (In Russ).

⁶⁰ Soboleva N.E., Sokolov B.O. Changes in labor market status during the COVID-19 pandemic and subjective well-being of Russians // *Voprosy Ekonomiki*. 2021. Vol. 12. P. 139–153. (In Russ).

⁶¹ Sokolov B.O., Zavadskaya M. A. Individual experience of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic and political support in Russia (based on the Values in Crisis survey) // *Polis. Political Studies*. 2023. № 4. P. 152–167. (In Russ).

Survey data used in this study reflect the specifics of the Russian context only. Levels of national pride vary across countries and socio-demographic groups.⁶² External shocks, which limit the external validity of my work, can similarly distort the nature of the relationship between these variables in other countries. The problem of measurement invariance, that is, equivalent interpretation of survey instruments across social groups, is relevant to the external validity of this work. There are studies demonstrating invariance of positive measures of psychological health. At the same time, confirming measurement invariance is difficult due to problems related to question translation and cultural differences in the interpretation of individual measures of well-being. For example, it is far from clear what standards respondents rely on when assessing life satisfaction in countries as different as Germany, Russia and China.⁶³

One of the limitations often cited in survey research on attitudes toward government concerns respondents lying out for fear of being penalized for expressing dissent. However, a series of list experiments conducted by Timothy Fry and colleagues in Russia in 2015, 2020, and 2022 showed that opinion polls are more likely to show the president's real level of popularity. Russians do not distort their opinions when answering questions about attitudes toward him.⁶⁴ Accordingly, I can assume that the probability of the social desirability bias influencing outcomes of the study is low.

This study uses a single indicator of institutional trust, namely trust in the president, which was measured through the question “How much do you trust the President of Russia?”. Respondents chose from 4 answer options: “I don't trust him at all”, “I don't trust him very much”, “I trust him to some extent” and “I trust him completely”. Several factors determine the choice of this way of measuring. First, there are data limitations. The results of the survey used here as an empirical base contain only this formulation of the question on attitudes to the president. Using a single indicator entails certain

⁶² Smith T. W., Kim S. National Pride in Comparative Perspective: 1995/96 and 2003/04 // *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 2006. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 127–136.

⁶³ Bieda A. et al. Universal happiness? Cross-cultural measurement invariance of scales assessing positive mental health // *Psychological Assessment*. 2017. Vol. 29. № 4. P. 408–421.

⁶⁴ Frye T. et al. Is Putin's popularity real? // *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 2017. Vol. 33. № 1. P. 1–15.; Frye T. et al. Is Putin's popularity (still) real? A cautionary note on using list experiments to measure popularity in authoritarian regimes // *Post-Soviet Affairs*. 2023. Vol. 39. № 3. P. 213–222.

disadvantages because 1) a complex concept can only be partially covered; 2) the interpretation of the question will vary between respondents; and 3) one cannot understand possible contradictory attitudes toward the institution.⁶⁵ Nevertheless, I believe the use of a single indicator is sufficient to measure “a basic evaluative view [of the president] that hinges on how well [the president] is performing in line with people's normative expectations.”⁶⁶ Using this approach is conventional for studies of political trust.⁶⁷ Second, indicators of trust in other public institutions (e.g. parliaments, police or courts) were not included in the analysis due to the fact that this would have required a different theoretical approach, as the results of previous studies on the diversification of trust depending on the type of institution remain contradictory. Some researchers argue that people trust all institutions equally.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, there are data indicating that trust in central authorities may differ in its level from trust in regional and local political institutions.⁶⁹ The results of surveys conducted in Russia also show this tendency: there is different trust in federal institutions, regional authorities, “power” institutions, and the Russian Orthodox Church.⁷⁰ Accordingly, the question of affective sources of trust in other institutions of power remains beyond the scope of this study.

⁶⁵ Seyd B. How should we measure political trust? Brighton: Political Studies Association, 2016. P. 1–21.

⁶⁶ Hetherington M. J. The Political Relevance of Political Trust // *American Political Science Review*. 1998. Vol. 92. № 4. P. 791.

⁶⁷ E.g. Catterberg G., Moreno A. The Individual Bases of Political Trust: Trends in New and Established Democracies // *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*. 2006. Vol. 18. № 1. P. 31–48.; Marien S., Hooghe M. Does political trust matter? An empirical investigation into the relation between political trust and support for law compliance // *European Journal of Political Research*. 2011. Vol. 50. № 2. P. 267–291.; Berg L., Hjern M. National Identity and Political Trust // *Perspectives on European Politics and Society*. 2010. Vol. 11. № 4. P. 390–407.

⁶⁸ Hooghe M. Why There is Basically Only One Form of Political Trust // *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations*. 2011. Vol. 13. № 2. P. 269–275.

⁶⁹ Schneider I. Can We Trust Measures of Political Trust? Assessing Measurement Equivalence in Diverse Regime Types // *Social Indicators Research*. 2017. Vol. 133. № 3. P. 963–984.

⁷⁰ Popova O.V., Lagutin O.V. Political Views of the Youth: Loyalty or Protest? // *RUDN Journal of Political Science*. 2019. Vol. 21. № 4. P. 599-619. (In Russ.)

Studies have demonstrated that there are distinct dimensions of national identity. National attachment, patriotism,⁷¹ national pride, “critical” / “uncritical” patriotism,⁷² and civic / cultural perceptions of identity.⁷³ These constructs may have weak correlations with each other and divergent effects on people's behavior and beliefs.⁷⁴ However, due to the limited set of questions in the dataset, the only dimension of national that was empirically tested is national pride.

Contribution to the Discussion of the Problem in Existing Literature

Results of this paper may serve as a foundation for further research on affective factors of trust in the president. First, there was additional confirmation that the logic linking national pride and trust in the president can most likely be explained by relying on the ideas of social identity theory. There is a possibility that proud Russians support the president of the country because there is an expectation that a Russian should support the president. On the other hand, it is also possible to explain the trust of those who are proud through the expectation that the president represents and will continue to represent their interests. This logic can be understood in more detail only by turning to qualitative methodology.

Second, I demonstrated that just as national pride affects presidential trust, presidential trust affects national pride. The results of statistical modeling indicate that changes in national pride are likely to be primary: national pride rises or falls first, followed by a rise or fall in trust in the president. Nevertheless, I cannot conclude definitively whether pride changes trust or whether trust affects pride. The existence of such a direct and inverse effect between pride and trust in the president creates the need

⁷¹ Huddy L., Khatib N. American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement // *American Journal of Political Science*. 2007. Vol. 51. № 1. P. 63–77.

⁷² Schatz R. T., Staub E. Manifestations of blind and constructive patriotism: Personality correlates and individual–group relations // *Patriotism: In the lives of individuals and nations*. Chicago, IL, US: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1997. P. 229–245.

⁷³ Hansen H. E., Hesli V. L. National Identity: Civic, Ethnic, Hybrid, and Atomised Individuals // *Europe-Asia Studies*. 2009. Vol. 61. № 1. P. 1–28.

⁷⁴ Miller D., Ali S. Testing the national identity argument // *European Political Science Review*. 2014. Vol. 6. № 2. P. 237–259.

for a more detailed analysis of this mechanism. Pride and trust are a self-contained system where both elements support each other. One possible explanation to be tested is the role of norms and the need to maintain a coherent belief system.

Third, results highlight the influence of modernization in determining the outcomes of the political process. If we follow the model proposed by Inglehart and Welzel, as the quality of life of Russians improves, their value orientations should continue to move towards the values of self-expression and secular-rational perceptions of power. The growth of these values may increase the number of demands that citizens will make of incumbents. In the absence of coordination between the values and the implemented policy of the state, the change of value orientations of Russians may lead to a decreased trust in the president. The echoes of this phenomenon are already evident in results of my research. Moreover, inclusion of values in evaluated models demonstrated that the value profile, which the Russian authorities position as the “core” of their support, is indeed represented among Russians.

Fourth, I provide further evidence of the importance of affective factors of trust in the president. The results presented here suggest that individuals' levels of trust in the president are not formed solely as a result of thinking about information about the performance of the institutions of the state. Affective factors also play a significant role. National pride tells Russians with high national pride that they should trust the president. Values are another affective factor of trust in the president. If the course implemented by the president corresponds to the values of citizens, they will have no reason to distrust him, because the president performs actions that do not contradict what people consider desirable and acceptable. In the Russian case, the president's actions are more likely to elicit approval from citizens who have low emancipative values. Thus, I have shown that national pride facilitates the process of building trust in the president, while value orientations provide an additional criterion from which Russians draw to understand whether or not they should trust the president. This paper demonstrates that scholars working in political sociology need to pay more attention to analyzing the emotional side of political trust in order to explain a large share of variation in political behavior.

Fifth, the explanation of happiness as a product of national pride contributes to the debate on the determinants of subjective well-being and national pride as an independent variable. If this causal relationship is validated in the future through the use of data that were not collected during the period of external shocks, the results presented here may provide evidence of the robustness of this relationship. If, however, an attempt to validate my findings demonstrates the opposite direction of the relationship, this would create a need to refine the theoretical explanation of the causal relationship in a context-sensitive manner.

Statements to be defended

1. National pride affects trust in the president.
2. Trust in the president affects national pride.
3. Happiness increases trust in the president, but this effect is weaker compared to the positive effect of national pride.
4. The mechanism in which national pride first increases happiness scores, which then increases trust in the president, has not been empirically proven. Nor has the theoretically expected effect of happiness increasing national pride, a change in the level of which is followed by a rise in trust in the president, been confirmed.
5. The socio-demographic characteristics and value orientations of respondents who trust the president and are proud to be Russians are largely congruent. Low scores on the emancipatory values index, high religiosity, being female, high age, living in rural areas, and high income satisfaction more often characterize these groups of the population.
6. In the causal relationship between national pride and the level of happiness, it is pride that leads to changes in happiness, not vice versa.

Approbation of results

List of publications (in Russian):

1. Zubarev N. Socio-Psychological Sources of Mass Support for Autocracies: Literature Review. // Perm University Herald. Political Science. 2022. Vol. 16. №. 4. P. 118-126.
2. Zubarev N. National Pride as a Mediator of Trust in President: Case of Russia. // Politeia: Analysis. Chronicles. Prognosis. 2023. Vol. 108. №. 1. P. 126–140.
3. Zubarev N., Moreva I., Ponarin E. Subjective Well-being and National Pride of Russians: Causal Analysis. // Polis. Political Studies. 2024. №. 4. P. 56-70.

Conferences:

1. “St. Petersburg International Conference on Inequality and Diversity”, 13.11.2021, HSE St. Petersburg; Report: Nationalist Attitudes as a Source of Electoral Support for the Party of Power in Russia.
2. “12th LCSR International Workshop ‘Recent Advances in Cross-Cultural Research’ ”, 13.04.2023 г., HSE; Report: National Pride and Subjective Well-Being as Determinants of Political Support: The Case of Russia.
3. “13th LCSR International Workshop “Recent Advances in Comparative Study of Values”, 26.04.2024 г., HSE; Report: Subjective Well-Being, National Pride, and Trust in the President of Russia: A Path Analysis.

Seminars:

1. Internal Seminar of Ronald F. Inglehart Laboratory for Comparative Social Research, 22.02.2024 г., HSE; Report: National Pride as a Source of Trust in President of Russia.

Analysis of Data and Findings

In Chapter 1, I provide a detailed explanation of theoretical underpinnings of the relationship between national pride, happiness as an element of subjective well-being, and trust in president. Sections 1.1-1.3 provide a rationale for how social identity could influence behavior and attitudes of individuals (1.1), an explanation of why identification with a country could be considered a form of social identity (1.2), and finally (1.3) a description of approaches to measuring identification with national community through social surveys.

Early research in social psychology demonstrated that simply categorizing people into groups by assigning them a label was a sufficient stimulus to elicit preferences for one's own group.⁷⁵ The next important step in the development of social identity theory (SIT) was an understanding that social categories that people use to assign themselves to groups do not have clearly defined boundaries. Individual characteristics could make a person a more or less typical member of a particular group. One of the consequences of this theoretical proposition was a conclusion that social identity could have an ideal (prototypical) set of characteristics or a model of behavior that describes the most typical member of a group. Relating oneself to this prototype is part of the process of social identity formation.⁷⁶

Thus, the two main tenets of SIT are categorization as a process of defining boundaries between “your own” and “other” groups and favoritism of everything associated with “your own” group and alienation of everything considered “foreign”. How might these characteristics of social identity affect the behavior of individuals? Modeling individual behavior according to a prototypical group member implies a change in self-perception, attitudes, and behavior in accordance with this prototype. People's entire existence is determined by group norms “because norms prescribe the context-

⁷⁵ Tajfel H., Turner J. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict // *The social psychology of intergroup relations* / eds. W. G. Austin, S. Worchel. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1979. P. 33–47.

⁷⁶ Tajfel H., Turner J. C. *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior* // *Key readings in social psychology. Political psychology: Key readings* / eds. J. T. Jost, J. Sidanius. New York, NY: Psychology Press, 2004. P. 276–293.; Huddy L. *From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory* // *Political Psychology*. 2001. T. 22. № 1. P. 127–156.

specific attitudes and behaviors acceptable for group members.”⁷⁷ Contextuality of social identities implies that the impact of an identity should be analyzed in those contexts where it is most relevant. Norms will only have an effect when an identity that sets them is relevant. Further, SIT also suggests that norms will only influence the behavior of people who identify most strongly with the group. Behavior according to group standards is also possible because people are more likely to align behavior with attitudes (here it is important to remember that social identity shapes attitudes) when the “normative climate”⁷⁸ encourages behavior consistent with attitudes as something important to group members.

Further, section 1.2 points out that the SIT could be applied to better understand national identity. Namely, it can be determined that national identity involves a clear division between “your own” and “foreign” national communities, a declared preference for “your own” nation, and an emotional attachment to it. Individuals with a strong national identity, as predicted by the SIT, should look to a prototypical representative of their nation to form their value system and behaviors. Accordingly, this suggests that the contextualization of national identity carries weight. The implication is that members of different nations will have different ideal models of values and behaviors.

In section 1.3, I identify and define conceptualizations of attachment to one's own country such as 'national identity', 'patriotism', 'national pride' and 'national chauvinism'. It is important to remember that there are individual level differences with a source of the latter being a sense of closeness or distance from the group prototype or core values espoused by prototypical [group] members.⁷⁹ These differences describe how people could differ at the individual level with respect to the strength (importance) of identities and attitudes.

⁷⁷ Terry D. J., Hogg M. A., White K. M. Attitude–behavior relations: Social identity and group membership // Attitudes, behavior, and social context: The role of norms and group membership. Applied social research. Mahwah, NJ, US: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2000. P. 72.

⁷⁸ Ibid. P. 74.

⁷⁹ Huddy L. From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social Identity Theory // Political Psychology. 2001. Vol. 22. № 1. P. 127–156.

Section 1.4 provides a definition of political trust and lists a number of approaches to its study. I use Mark Hetherington's definition of political support as it fits the theoretical framework of the thesis research. Hetherington understands trust as “the extent to which people perceive that the government produces outcomes consistent with their expectations.”⁸⁰

Section 1.5 describes the conceptualization of subjective well-being and several of its determinants. Subjective well-being (SW) researchers are interested in analyzing how people evaluate their own lives. Satisfaction with certain areas of life, such as, for example, marriage or career, and emotional reactions to events that happen to people (positive affect or absence of negative affect) can be identified as separate dimensions. Empirically, it has been proven that there are two distinct emotional sides of SB, which involve the evaluation of events that are currently taking place in life. On one side is the “pleasant affect” which includes joy, delight, contentment, pride, affection, happiness, and ecstasy. On the other hand, “unpleasant affect” consists of guilt and shame, sadness, anxiety, anger, stress, depression, and envy. It has been shown in research that all four facets of SB (positive and negative affect, life satisfaction, and life domain satisfaction) are separate constructs.⁸¹ In the empirical part of the thesis research, only the level of happiness is analyzed, as this indicator of SB refers to emotional ways of assessing the state of life.

Psychologists consider personality traits to be among the most stable and influential factors shaping subjective well-being. First of all, these are extraversion and neuroticism, which have a strong correlation with positive and negative affect, respectively.⁸² At the same time, the process of evaluating one's life can be cognitively driven when people use a comparison of current state to some standard. Those who have several close friends or

⁸⁰ Hetherington M. J. *Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. P. 9.

⁸¹ Diener E. et al. Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress // *Psychological Bulletin*. 1999. Vol. 125. № 2. P. 276–302.

⁸² Diener E., Oishi S., Lucas R. E. Personality, Culture, and Subjective Well-Being: Emotional and Cognitive Evaluations of Life // *Annual Review of Psychology*. 2003. Vol. 54. P. 403–425.

a spouse on average appear to be happier compared to other people. That said, changes in social ties can lead to subsequent increases or decreases in life satisfaction.⁸³

Subjective well-being has a cross-country dimension: people living in different countries use different bases for assessing well-being. The post-Soviet region is characterized by the division of countries into two clusters: in one of them (Central Asia, Azerbaijan and Armenia) the assessment of happiness is dependent on cultural and national factors, while in the other (Eastern Europe and Georgia) happiness is more often determined by socio-economic factors. Cultural-national factors in this case include the norms of perception and expression of happiness, the structure of personality types and collective socio-psychological traits. Socio-economic and political factors include GDP per capita, inflation, economic inequality, the amount of social support of the population by the state, the development of democracy, the level of corruption, life expectancy, urbanization and the level of education.⁸⁴

Section 1.6 of Chapter One provides a theoretical rationale for the tested mechanisms of the relationship between levels of happiness, national pride, and trust in the president. One of the underlying principles explaining the relationship between national identity and trust in the president indicates that people are more likely to trust those groups with whom they believe they share an identity. Experimental evidence demonstrates that people with the same identity can expect fair actions toward each other (e.g., resource allocation).⁸⁵ In the Russian context, political elites invest a large amount of resources in symbolic policies aimed at spreading the idea of the special importance of the Russian nation. This may encourage additional trust among those who have a high strength of national pride, as their policy preferences are likely to coincide with such a

⁸³ Diener E., Tamir M., Scollon C. N. Happiness, Life Satisfaction, and Fulfillment: The Social Psychology of Subjective Well-Being // *Bridging Social Psychology* / ed. P. A. M. Van Lange. Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers, 2006. P. 319-324.

⁸⁴ Andreenkova A. V. Cross-National Differences in Level of Happiness in the Post-Soviet Countries: A Comparative Analysis // *Monitoring of Public Opinion: Economic and Social Changes*. 2020. № 1. P. 316—339. (In Russ.)

⁸⁵ Lenard P. T., Miller D. Trust and National Identity // *The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust* / ed. E. M. Uslaner. Oxford University Press, 2018. P. 57-74.

symbolic policy strategy.⁸⁶ Pride and trust can be positively related if there is a societal expectation that a group member should trust political institutions.⁸⁷

On the one hand, it is also possible that voters are better at remembering the good or the bad aspects of an incumbent's performance. Therefore, they make judgments about incumbents based on the facts that remain in their memory. On the other hand, voters may also attribute their emotional state to the incumbent's performance.⁸⁸ Consequently, I expect that there is a positive correlation between indicators of subjective well-being and trust in president among Russians.

High satisfaction in one sphere of life could have a spillover effect on satisfaction in another sphere. For example, people with high well-being could also be highly satisfied with the state of the nation that they belong to. Individual subjective well-being could change simultaneously with satisfaction with group identity if group membership is particularly important to an individual.⁸⁹

From the point of view of theory, the mechanism of the relationship between national pride, happiness and institutional trust may be even more complex. On the one hand, national pride can increase happiness, a change in the level of which will be followed by changes in trust in institutions. On the other hand, there is a possible logic in which first happiness will decrease or increase, which will become a reason to be less or more proud of one's national identity, and this will be followed by a change in trust.

According to Welzel's theory of emancipative democratization, control of behavior at the individual level becomes particularly important with the spread of economic development. Population groups that have orientation towards emancipative values are

⁸⁶ Miller A. H. Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970 // *American Political Science Review*. 1974. Vol. 68. № 3. P. 951–972.

⁸⁷ Axelrod R. An Evolutionary Approach to Norms // *The American Political Science Review*. 1986. Vol. 80. № 4. P. 1095–1111.

⁸⁸ Healy A., Malhotra N. Retrospective Voting Reconsidered // *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2013. Vol. 16., 2013. P. 285–306

⁸⁹ Reeskens T., Wright M. Subjective Well-Being and National Satisfaction: Taking Seriously the “Proud of What?” Question // *Psychological Science* 2011. Vol. 22. № 11. P. 1460–1462.; Steele L. G., Lynch S. M. The Pursuit of Happiness in China: Individualism, Collectivism, and Subjective Well-Being During China’s Economic and Social Transformation // *Social Indicators Research*. 2013. Vol. 114. № 2. P. 441–451.; Ha S. E., Jang S.-J. National Identity, National Pride, and Happiness: The Case of South Korea // *Social Indicators Research*. 2015. Vol. 121. № 2. P. 471–482.

often more critical of incumbents because of they are very demanding of authority figures. Moreover, I would also expect emancipative value orientation to be negatively related to national pride because these population groups rely less on obligations that accompany collectivist national pride.⁹⁰

According to the logic of “blind retrospection”,⁹¹ the chain of citizens' thinking can be reconstructed as follows. A person assesses their level of well-being -> given the weight that the state plays in the life of each citizen, a person attributes the level of their own well-being to performance of the state -> the latter creates an incentive to increase, decrease, or leave unchanged the pride for the country. Cause-and-effect relationship can run from national pride to subjective well-being in times when the group is successful. This relationship is a consequence of the fact that a person's self-esteem is often dependent on how he or she views the group that he or she belongs to.⁹² On the other hand, group membership and identification with a group that is subjectively superior to other groups can have a positive effect on the level of subjective well-being, as a person's position is subjectively perceived as a superior one to other people.⁹³

Chapters 2 and 3 contain results of the empirical part of the study. Chapter 2 clarifies causal relationships between national pride, happiness, and trust in president. Tests of hypotheses 1.1-2.2, 4.1, and 4.1 were conducted there. Specifically, tests of assumptions regarding the correlation between the key variables. Mediation analysis was also included in this chapter.

Using the methods described above allowed us to show the following results. There are two routes (mechanisms) by which national pride increases trust in the president. First, national pride in the first wave of the survey is closely related to national pride in the

⁹⁰ Welzel C. *Freedom Rising: Human empowerment and the contemporary quest for emancipation*. Cambridge University Press, 2013.

⁹¹ Achen C. H., Bartels L. M. *Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government*. Princeton University Press, 2016.

⁹² De Vries R. E. Self, in-group, and out-group evaluation: bond or breach? // *European Journal of Social Psychology*. 2003. Vol. 33. № 5. P. 609–621.

⁹³ Fujita F. The frequency of social comparison and its relation to subjective well-being // *The science of subjective well-being* / eds. M. Eid, R. J. Larsen. New York, NY: The Guilford Press, 2008. P. 239–257.

second wave. In turn, pride in the second wave of the survey is positively related to trust in the president in the third wave. Thus, trust in the president in the third wave is a direct consequence of the level of national pride in the second wave and at the same time an indirect consequence of the level of national pride in the first wave. Second, national pride in the first wave increases trust in the president in the second wave of the survey, which in turn is closely related to trust in the president in the third wave of the survey.

Happiness has no statistically significant effect on national pride in all combinations of survey waves. Theoretically, the expected effect, in which happiness would increase national pride, which in turn would increase trust in the president, is absent. However, this does not negate the fact that happiness itself can increase trust in the president. According to my data, the assumption that national pride increases happiness, changes in which are followed by increases in trust, proved to be incorrect. However, the model demonstrated that an increase in national pride makes Russians happier. As a consequence, I can conclude that in the link between subjective well-being and national pride it is pride that increases the level of happiness, and not vice versa.

A direct and inverse relationship between national pride and trust in the president is demonstrated: just as pride can increase trust in the president, trust in the president can increase national pride. It is impossible to say with certainty which of these variables is primary, as they have a reciprocal effect on each other. An important empirical result of this paper is the contrast between the close relationship between national pride and trust in the president on the one hand, and the weak effect of happiness on trust in the president on the other hand. One of the possible explanations for this contrast may be that pride and trust in the president belong to the public sphere of life, while happiness belongs to the private sphere. Publicity of national pride consists in the fact that when speaking about a certain level of pride, a person enters into a dialog with (1) norms defining membership in the national community; (2) goals shared by members of the national community; (3) ways of comparing one's national community with other communities; (4) cognitive models suggesting a certain level of pride; (4) cognitive models suggesting a certain level of trust in the president; and (5) cognitive models suggesting a certain level of trust in the president. National pride and trust in the president can support each other as the attitudes

closest to the public sphere, interacting with which citizens feel the need to protect public interests, the need to “preserve and promote the image of actions and values embodied in it.” Such protection is expressed in the emphasized high trust in the president and a high degree of national pride.⁹⁴

Chapter 3 of the dissertation demonstrated that those who trust president and those who are proud to be Russian have very similar socio-demographic characteristics and value orientations. These groups are more often characterized by high religiosity, age and satisfaction with income, being female and living in rural areas. Those who trust the president and are proud to be Russians have low values of the emancipative values index. Among components of the index, “choice” values have the most significant negative effect, implying that those who are prouder and trusting of president are more likely to consider homosexuality, divorce, and abortion to be completely unacceptable or acceptable only sometimes. The second largest effect was produced by “equality” values. Those who trust president and are proud to be Russians are more likely to believe that (1) men are better politicians than women, (2) priority in job distribution in times of economic hardship should be given to men, and (3) education is more important for boys than for girls. The third largest effect size came from “autonomy” values. Those who trust president and citizens with high national pride are more likely to consider obedience to be an important quality to develop when raising children, but they do not consider imagination and independence to be such qualities.

I would like to note that my results do not imply that only these groups of the population trust the president. As a percentage, support among them may approach 100%. Young urban non-religious males with high rates of emancipative values could also be supporters of the president. However, the concentration of opposition-minded citizens is higher among them.

94 Abdelal R. et al. *Identity as a Variable // Measuring Identity: A Guide for Social Scientists* / eds. R. Abdelal et al. Cambridge University Press, 2009. P. 17–32.